Kelp DAO claims LayerZero’s ‘default’ settings are what actually caused the massive $290 million disaster
The liquid restaking protocol said the compromised verifier was LayerZero’s own infrastructure, and the setup it was faulted for running was LayerZero’s onboarding default.
What to know:
- Kelp DAO is disputing LayerZero’s account of a $290 million rsETH bridge exploit, claiming that the compromised single-verifier setup relied on LayerZero’s own infrastructure and defaults rather than an outlier configuration it chose against advice.
- Some security researchers say LayerZero’s public documentation and deployment code promote single-source verification across major chains, undercutting the firm’s claim that Kelp ignored guidance to adopt multi-verifier redundancy.
- Kelp claims the attack was limited to the LayerZero-powered bridge and not its core restaking contracts, while LayerZero has responded by vowing to stop signing messages for any application using a single-verifier setup, forcing a broad migration.
Kelp is a liquid restaking protocol that takes user-deposited ether, routes it through a yield-generating system called EigenLayer, and issues a receipt token, rsETH, in exchange.
LayerZero is the cross-chain messaging infrastructure that moves rsETH between blockchains, using entities called DVNs (decentralized verifier networks) to verify whether a cross-chain transfer is valid.
On Saturday, attackers drained 116,500 rsETH, worth about $290 million, from Kelp’s LayerZero-powered bridge by poisoning the servers that LayerZero’s verifier relied on to check transactions.
Kelp, the source said, is planning on saying the DVN that was compromised via what it calls a “sophisticated state-sponsored attack” was LayerZero’s own infrastructure, not a third-party verifier.
